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Abstract:  
We present an optimization model of the European natural gas market which is intended for 
the use within a regulatory approach providing incentives for efficient transmission 
investments. The stylized model is designed as welfare maximization taking into account 
production, pipeline, LNG, and storage constraints. We develop several scenarios to analyze 
the future development of the European natural gas market. 
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1 Introduction 
In order to develop a regulatory regime that provides incentives for pipeline owners/operators 
to invest in new pipeline infrastructure we need a simplified representation of the European 
natural gas market containing information on pipeline capacities, entry and exit points of the 
system, LNG landing facilities, and storage capacities. Whereas numerical modeling exercises 
regularly try to forecast market situations this paper describes a simplified representation of 
the main natural gas infrastructure in Europe. In later studies the model can be used as market 
representation to test a proposed regulatory model which removes existing cross-border 
bottlenecks in the European long-distance natural gas pipeline system.  
We are interested in identifying existing transportation bottlenecks and the impact of 
Investments into Transmission facilities of natural Gas on the market outcome (InTraGas-
Model). Therefore, we design a welfare maximization approach subject to constraints of 
natural gas infrastructure facilities. The focus is on optimization of the long-distance transport 
neglecting influences of strategic company behavior on the exporter side, interaction of 
traders in Europe, or market power concerns on the intra-European transmission network 
level.  
The literature on natural gas transportation models mainly distinguishes three approaches. The 
system dynamic approach has been applied by two studies so far (Stäcker, 2004; Hallouche 
and Tamvaski, 2005). EWI Cologne has produced a series of linear optimization models 
(EUGAS, TIGER, MAGELAN), of which the TIGER model provides the most detailed 
dispatch model for Europe and is suited for identifying congestion (Perner and Seeliger, 2004; 
Lochner and Bothe, 2007). The dynamic model optimizes long-term European natural gas 
supply taking into account production and transportation facilities. Model outputs are mainly 
flows and supply costs. In order to allow for strategic behavior, market power and other 
market imperfections of the (European) natural gas market recent literature dominantly relies 
on the complementarity framework. In a first application Mathiessen et al. (1987) show that 
the European natural gas market is best described by a Cournot duopoly. The following works 
by Golombek et al. (1995, 1998) distinguish between up- and downstream players in the 
natural gas market and show the positive impact of market restructuring on upstream 
competition and welfare. Several streams within this literature evolved, which focus on (and 
study) different issues such as multi-period modeling and supply disruptions, double 
marginalization, or the cartel creation of exporters settings. The World Gas Model (WGM) 
provides a high level of granularity in a game-theoretic context while still covering 95% of 
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world natural gas production (Egging et al., 2009). Holz (2009) discusses these different 
model families in more detail.  
Investment in infrastructure in all of these models is best described as a net present value 
calculation optimization. Hence, even if the complementarity framework so far has attracted 
the largest share of researchers and literature it has yet not been able to include a convincing 
regulatory investment mechanism. The next section provides the model formulation and 
specifies the data sources. Section 3 applies the model to a set of stylized scenarios and 
discusses the results. We conclude with an outlook on further research in this area.   
 
2 Model Formulations and Data 
The InTraGas model represents a stylized representation of the existing European natural gas 
network including the major non-European exporting countries, i.e. Russia or Algeria, and the 
transit countries. The model takes into account storage, pipeline and LNG restrictions and can 
be utilized to obtain a competitive benchmark including congestion mark-ups. This section 
provides the mathematical formulation and the underlying dataset. 
2.1 Model formulation 
The market model5 is formulated as non-linear optimization program maximizing social 
welfare under the assumption of perfect competition taking into account technical constraints: 
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5 The model is dynamic in the sense that it covers 12 months, but static as it does not take into account investments over the 
same time period. 
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The objective of our market model is a welfare maximization (equation 1): We derive the 
gross consumer surplus assuming a linear demand function p(d) for each country and subtract 
the accumulated costs for production (g), pipeline transport (flow), and LNG transport 
(LNGflow). Production costs cn are differentiated by production site, pipeline costs tcn,m 
depend on transport distance between starting node n and end node m; LNG cost LNGtcn,m 
include shipping costs and are differentiated according to the shipping route from n to m. 
Liquefaction and regasification costs are included as losses in the energy balance.  
The welfare maximization is subject to several technical restrictions representing the 
underlying production, storage, and transportation limitations. First, production gn,t at site n in 
any period t can not exceed the maximum available production capacity gmax (equation 2). The 
flow flown,m,t on a pipeline connecting n and m can not exceed the pipeline’s capacity flowmax 
(equation 3). LNG transport routes are not limited in the available transport capacity. 
Equation 4 therefore only represents the available sea routes connecting specific nodes n and 
m that have the necessary LNG facilities. The capacity limit LNGflowmax is chosen such that 
no restrictions occur on those available sea routes whereas non available connections have no 
LNG transport capacity. The actual amount of LNG transport initiated at a node n is therefore 
limited by the installed liquefaction capacities Liquefactionmax (equation 5) and the incoming 
LNG transport is limited by the installed regasification capacities Regasificationmax (equation 
6). 
To take account of the dynamic nature of the natural gas market the model consists of 12 
periods t that represent one month each. Storage plays an important role in natural gas 
markets to manage demand and production variation during seasons.6  The storage level 
storen,t at a site in period t is defined by the previous periods storage level storen,t-1 and 
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injections to (sin) and withdrawals from (sout) storage (equation 7). We assume that over one 
year the injected and withdrawn amounts sum to zero. The previous periods storage level 
storen,t-1 in the first period t=1 is therefore set equal to the resulting storage level in the last 
period t=12. The storage level as well as injections and withdrawals are further limited in 
their maximum capacities (equation 8). 
The market is cleared via a nodal energy balance constraint (equation 9). All injections at a 
node n (left hand side of equation 9) have to be at least as big as all withdrawals at that node 
(right hand side of equation 9). LNG injection and withdrawals take account of losses during 
liquefaction and regasification processes. Incoming LNG flows (LNGflowm,n) are reduced by 
the factor η to account for energy needed for regasification reducing the amount of available 
natural gas for demand (dn) or pipeline transport (flown,m). Outgoing LNG flows 
(LNGflown,m) are increased by the factor 1/μ to take into account energy needed for the 
liquefaction process. Thus, the required amount of produced natural gas (gn) increases in 
order to balance the constraint. The nodal market price is derived via the obtained optimal 
demand d* and the linear demand function p(d). The model is incorporated into GAMS using 
Conopt as solver. 
 
2.2 Data 
The underlying dataset is based on publicly available sources. The reference data is calibrated 
to represent 2005 values and is provided on a monthly basis covering a representative year. 
Seasonal fluctuations in demand and supply of natural gas as well as storage patterns can thus 
be captured. The network is a stylized representation of the existing gas pipeline system 
aggregating all facilities within one country into one node. Cross border connections between 
countries are summed up within one pipeline connecting the respective country nodes. The 
market includes the Western and Central European countries with a surrounding system of 
major natural gas exporting regions for both pipeline and LNG (Figure 1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 Due to the monthly time level storage utilization due to short term variations is not taken into account. 
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Figure 1: Stylized network of the EU natural gas market 
Source: Own presentation 
 
Production data (gtmax) are taken from IEA (2006) and BP (2006). For non-exporting 
countries indigenous production is defined as maximum production capacity. For the 
European natural gas exporting regions Norway, the Netherlands and the UK we consider 
December production as maximum capacity constraint. The production constraint for non-
European natural gas exporting countries is determined by dividing the yearly production 
values using Norway’s monthly production schedule as reference and the December value as 
maximum capacity constraint. 
Production costs (cn) are taken from OME (2005). For most of the non-European exporting 
countries these figures were readily available. For Norway and Russia we use the average of 
production costs from different sites7; for Ireland the costs of the UK are used. For the 
continental European countries we use costs of the Norway-North Sea pipe as reference. 
Production costs range from as little as 0,45€/MBtu in Algeria to more than 1,70€/MBtu in 
the UK. However, the majority of exporters produce in a cost range of about 0,30-
0,60€/MBtu.  
Reference demand is taken from the same sources as production data (IEA, 2006; and BP, 
2006). The coverage includes all Western and Central European countries up to Poland, 
Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia as eastern boundary (see Figure 1). Demand of other 
                                                     
7 Russia-Yamal, Russia-Nadym-Pur-Taz, Russia-Volga-Ural and Russia-Barent Sea - Baltic Sea. 
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countries as well as global interactions with the American and Asian natural gas market are 
not regarded in our model. For countries were only yearly demand values are available Poland 
is used as reference for the demand curve. Given the reference demand levels a linear demand 
function (p(d)) is derived assuming a reference price of 2.75 €/MBTU and a demand elasticity 
of -0.3 at that point.  
Natural gas pipeline capacities (flowmax) between the nodes of the model are gathered from 
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE, 2005). The capacities of all connections between two nodes 
are added and transformed into mcm per month. Interconnection capacities between exporting 
countries like Russia and Ukraine are not available. We assume that these pipeline capacities 
are not limiting the exports towards Europe and thus do not display any bottleneck.8 
Transportation costs for pipeline transmission are derived from OME (2005) and transposed 
into a transport price per km and transported volume (tcn,m). Given the representation of a 
country as a node we define the length of a pipeline as the distance between the two country 
centers.  
Natural gas underground storage capacities per country are characterized by three parameters: 
working gas volume (storemax), peak withdrawal (soutmax) and peak injection capacity 
(sinmax).9 The values for the different storage facilities of each country are taken from GIE 
(GIE, 2009a) and the storage operators’ websites and aggregated into single values for each 
country. 
The basic model setting also includes all liquefaction and regasification terminals in operation 
in 2005. Aggregated data on a monthly basis is available from GIE (GIE, 2009b). Losses 
generated during liquefaction (about 12% of the total intake of natural gas) and regasification 
(1%) are captured in the energy balance constraint of the model (IEA, 1994, pp. 50-51).  
Even though LNG transportation capacity (LNGflowmax) is considered a constraint in the 
maximization problem, we argue that there exists no real limit to this parameter. It solely 
represents existing LNG trade links between nodes in our model. We restrict this capacity to 
10.000 mcm/month for trade between nodes where LNG is already shipped under long-term 
contracts in 2005. Transportation costs for LNG are approximated by a shipping cost value 
(LNGscr) of 0.67 € per seamile and mcm. This is based on monthly LNG import prices into 
Europe (IEA, 2008), average speed of the world fleet of LNG carriers and 0.25% of cargo 
tank capacity used to fuel the vessel (IEA, 1994). We then derive the distances between LNG 
ex- and importing nodes, calculate averages if there are multiple connection possibilities and 
multiply this with the cost value to obtain a route specific cost value (LNGtcn,m). 
                                                     
8 This assumption then translates into a transport capacity of 15.000 mcm/ month. 
9 Peak withdrawal and injection capacities were transformed from mcm/day to mcm/month. 
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Table 1: Dataset for calibration 
Country 
Average 
Production 
Capacity 
(mcm/month) 
Average 
Reference 
demand 
(mcm/month) 
Working 
gas volume 
(mcm) 
Peak 
withdrawal 
capacity 
(mcm/month) 
Peak 
injection 
capacity 
(mcm/month) 
Lique 
faction 
(mcm/month) 
Regasifi 
cation 
(mcm/month) 
Austria 136 795 2820 952 851  
Belgium 0 1200     
Czech Republic 15 793 2255 1041 768  
Denmark 871 415 810 402 201  
France 160 3875 14303 7199 4121  1208
Germany 1654 8480 17584 13132 5962  
Hungary 243 1238 3460 1425 1088  
Ireland 45 335     
Italy 1002 7175 13290 7596 3987  292
Netherlands 6567 4124     
Norway 7387 560    483 
Poland 507 1354     
Portugal 0 358 150 210 75  433
Slovakia 12 541 2320 986 806  
Slovenia 0 97     
Spain 14 2686 3742 4488 288  2092
Sweden 0 78     
Switzerland 0 283     
UK 7733 8340 3589 3458 783  375
Russia 58532     
Turkmenistan 5755     
Azerbaijan 519     
Iran 8516     
Qatar 4258    1587 
Egypt 3396    932 
Libya 1145    104 
Algeria 8594    2588 
Nigeria 2134    1001 
T&T 2839    1104 
Source: As described in this section. 
 
3 Scenarios and Results 
We simulate several future developments for the European natural gas market to identify 
possible congestion problems and price developments. The model resembles a competitive 
environment thus market power concerns are neglected and the obtained prices represent a 
lower boundary. 
3.1 Scenarios 
We first derive a 2005 reference case with the above described dataset as benchmark (see 
Table 1). The remaining scenarios represent developments up to 2015. All cases rely on a 
basic extension of the reference case including additional pipelines, LNG terminals, 
production sites and demand adaptation (IEA, 2008; GSE, 2009). To keep our model simple 
and tractable production costs and the reference price of 2.75 €/MBTU are kept constant 
across all scenarios. We assume that demand will increase by an average of 1.5% per year 
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until 2015 (IEA, 2008). Production in Europe will decline by about 7% whereas production in 
the exporting countries will increase by 10% to 94% (IEA, 2008). Several pipeline projects 
are expected to become operational by 2015. The most important ones are the North- and 
South-Stream connecting Russia directly with European import countries avoiding transit 
through Belarus or the Ukraine, and the Nabucco pipeline connecting the Caspian gas fields 
with Europe mitigating the dependence on deliveries from Russia. 
Regarding LNG facilities we include all projects that are under construction according to IEA 
(2008) and scheduled until 2015. On the exporting side in particular Qatar will extend its 
capacities significantly. On the importing side the UK currently expands its capacities 
significantly, but also Belgium and the Netherlands are going to diversify their supplies by 
adding regasification facilities. Spain, Italy, and France are extending their existing capacities 
to a similar level of import capacity by 2015. Among the major natural gas importing 
countries only Germany will have no opportunity to import LNG in 2015. 
Regarding gas storage nearly all European countries are planning extensions of their existing 
capacities (GSE, 2009). The basic extension set represents the 2015 base case (i.e. the 
expected market development until 2015). This case is adjusted subsequently to test the 
impact of several possible future developments in three further cases. First, a significant 
decline of indigenous production within Europe is modeled (EU case). We assume that the 
Netherlands and Norway face a 20% lower production level and the UK faces a sharp decline 
to 30% of its 2005 production capacity (Gabriel et al., 2008). The reduced local production 
will increase import dependence of Europe and most likely lead to a higher price level. 
Second, we assume that Russia has a conflict with its transit countries and cuts its supplies via 
Belarus and the Ukraine (Russian case). As we assume that the North- and South-Stream 
pipelines are finished by 2015, Russia can still rely on those for its exports to Europe. 
Nevertheless, the reduced transmission capacity will lead both to quantity and price 
movements in Europe. Finally, we assume a further extension of LNG facilities in Europe and 
exporting countries which could reduce import dependency of Europe on natural gas from 
Russian (LNG case). An overview of the adjusted dataset for the scenarios is presented in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: Scenario overview 
 Reference case EU case Russian case LNG case 
Year 2005 2015 
Demand level* 100% 116% 
Production* 100% UK: 20% 
Norway, NL: 80% 
Otherwise similar to 
Russian and LNG case 
- EU: 93% 
- Transition Countries: 116% 
- Russia: 110% 
- Africa: 150% 
- Middle East: 194% 
- Other: 130% 
New pipelines* na - Russia - Germany (55 bcm/y) 
- Russia - Bulgaria (30 bcm/y) 
- Azerbaijan - Austria via Turkey (31 bcm/y) 
- Turkey - Italy via Greece (8 bcm/y) 
- Algeria - Italy (8 bcm/y) 
- Algeria - Spain (8 bcm/y) 
- Norway - Denmark (7 bcm/y) 
Unavailable 
pipelines 
na none All pipelines from 
Russia to EU via 
Belarus / Ukraine 
none 
Liquefaction   Regasification 
- Qatar: 83 bcm/y                  - France: 8.25 bcm/y 
- Algeria: 6.1 bcm/y  - Belgium: 4.5 bcm/y 
- Egypt: 6.5 bcm/y                  - NL: 9 bcm/y 
- Nigeria: 12.3 bcm/y  - Italy: 11.75 bcm/y 
- Norway: 5.6 bcm/y  - Spain: 8 bcm/y 
- Trinidad: 7.1 bcm/y  - UK: 43 bcm/y 
New LNG facilities* 
 
na 
 
  Liquefaction 
- Iran: 80 bcm/y 
- Algeria: 5.4 bcm/y 
- Lybia: 3.3 bcm/y 
- Egypt: 7.2 bcm/y 
- Nigeria: 40 bcm/y  
- Trinidad: 7.1 bcm/y 
Regasification  
- France: 32 bcm/y 
- NL:  16 bcm/y 
- Germany: 14 bcm/y 
- Italy: 17.5 bcm/y 
- Spain: 14.4 bcm/y 
- Portugal: 3 bcm/y 
- UK: 3 bcm/y 
- Ireland: 4.1 bcm/y  
New storage 
facilities# 
na - Austria: 1200 mcm/month 
- Belgium: 100 mcm/month 
- France: 540 mcm/month 
- Germany: 1381 mcm/month 
- Hungary: 2300 mcm/month 
- Italy: 4152 mcm/month 
- NL: 180 mcm/month 
- Poland: 30 mcm/month 
- UK: 640 mcm/month 
Sources: * IEA (2008), #GIE (2009a) 
 
3.2 Scenario results 
In the 2005 reference case we observe a separation of Europe into several price zones:10 
Portugal and Spain constitute a separate market from the rest of Continental Europe due to the 
limited interconnection capacities between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe. The 
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same applies to the UK and Ireland. Germany, Austria and Eastern Europe are located in a 
more or less common price zone defined by natural gas imports from Russia. Finally, France, 
Italy and Switzerland are in a high price area due to their limited import capacities and 
existing congestion along the route from Russia. The average price level in the EU is about 
2.32 €/MBTU. Existing LNG capacities in Europe are fully utilized and most of the available 
import capacities from Russia and Africa are congested. Within Europe we observe 
congestion between the producing countries (the Netherlands and Norway) and the connected 
importing countries (Belgium, France, and Germany). 
The expected development of new infrastructure by 2015 (base case) leads to a small price 
reduction across Europe (Figure 2).  The average price drops by 3% to 2.26 €/MBTU with 
Europe split into similar price areas as compared to 2005. However, the physical flow 
situation does change. Declining production within Europe combined with simultaneously 
increasing import capacities results in increasing import dependency (Figure 3). The increased 
LNG capacity is again fully utilized in particular with substantially increased exports from 
Qatar. In contrast, new build and existing pipelines from Russia to Europe are not fully 
utilized. The North-Stream pipeline shows a utilization of less than 50% with major supplies 
towards Germany transiting via Poland. Natural gas from the Caspian region plays only a 
minor role and is mainly used to supply Italy. 
In the first scenario (EU case) we assume a significant decline in North Sea production until 
2015. The UK and Ireland face the highest price increase due to the assumed reduction of UK 
production to 30% of its 2005 level. Other countries depending on North Sea natural gas 
(France, Benelux, and Germany) also face price increases whereas prices in the remaining 
European countries are not affected. The price level increases to 2.58 €/MBTU on average. 
LNG import facilities remain to be fully utilized. The lack of indigenous production is 
compensated by increasing imports from Russia and consequently the pipeline system in 
Eastern Europe is operating at a higher load level. 
In the second scenario we assume that Russia cuts its transports to Europe via transition 
countries (Russian case). This shutdown of a significant share of Europe’s imports has a 
significant price impact particularly on Central and Eastern European countries that heavily 
rely on Russian natural gas. The average price level rises to 3.25 €/MBTU. Germany acts as a 
transmission platform due to its still intact connection to Russia via the North-Stream pipeline 
and provides natural gas to Poland and the Czech Republic. Similar, the South-Stream 
pipeline is utilized to supply the South-Eastern region and the Nabucco pipeline is used to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 A graphical representation of all cases is provided in the Appendix. The prices reported are annual averages; monthly 
prices are available from the authors upon request. 
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transport Caspian gas to Europe. However, the available capacities are too small to cancel out 
the effect of the Russian export reduction. 
In a last scenario we extend the available LNG importing facilities in Europe and the 
exporting facilities in producing countries. This provides the European market with an 
increased diversification potential (LNG case). Consequently the price level in Europe is more 
equalized and significantly lower than in all other cases. The average price level is about 2.06 
€/MBTU. In particular, the Iberian Peninsula profits from the increased LNG availability, but 
also Central Europe faces lower prices and less pipeline congestion. The import dependency 
of Europe from Russian natural gas is even below the Russian case. Overall, in this case 
Europe has four large import countries with equal share of supplies (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2: Average prices 
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Figure 3: Average production 
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3.3 Discussion 
The modeled cases show the possible impact of future developments of the European natural 
gas transmission infrastructure. European import dependency is to increase given the expected 
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rise of demand for and a simultaneous decrease in indigenous production of natural gas. For a 
faster decrease in production than expected this dependency will increase even further (EU 
case). As major pipeline projects allow Russia to export more natural gas to Europe, the major 
share of future imports is still coming from there. Under the 2015 base case the full extent of 
export capacities is not even utilized as particularly the North-Stream pipeline seems to be 
oversized (Table 3). 
Increased LNG export capacities provide a source of diversification for European countries. 
Within the model particularly Qatar directs a large share of its exports to Europe given its 
relative low production costs. The Nabucco pipeline only plays a minor role in our model as 
the availability of Russian natural gas is sufficient to meet European demand. Only in the case 
of an interruption of Russian exports does the availability of Caspian gas provide a hedge for 
European customers. LNG facilities will have the largest impact on the future development 
since they provide an optimal diversification opportunity and thus allow a range of export 
countries to supply Europe (Table 3). 
The obtained results have to be evaluated against the background of assumptions and 
simplification of our model. First of all, the model does neglect a large part of the world 
natural gas market and thus misses possible impacts of international developments on the 
European market. This holds in particular for our LNG results since other importing countries 
are not included and consequently the full export capacity is available to European countries 
only within our model. Second, only the Central and Western European countries are included 
with a demand schedule. East and South East European countries are only transit points and 
thus their demand for natural gas is not part of our model allowing the natural gas 
transmission pipeline system to be exclusively used for exports to the modeled countries. 
The network furthermore represents a stylized system of the real world network. All pipelines 
connected to a country are connected with one another. Thus, the pipeline from the Caspian 
region is connected with the Russian South-Stream within Hungary. Also, the pipelines are 
mostly directed and a reverse of natural gas flows (e.g. in case of a Russian boycott) is not 
possible within the model. 
Finally, the model neglects any strategic behavior of market participants. Thus the obtained 
results provide the lower boundary for expected price developments. Given the market 
imperfections and the integration of the European natural gas market into a worldwide 
framework with competing regions for limited supplies (US, Asia) the real world 
developments are likely to result in a higher price level and a tighter congestion situation. 
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Table 3: Result overview 
 Reference 
case 
2015 base case EU case Russian case LNG case 
Average price 
[€/MBTU] 2,33 2,26 2,58 3,25 2,06 
LNG-regasification 
utilization 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 
Pipeline utilization:  
Russia-EU 65% 51% 69% 33% 32% 
Africa-EU 100% 87% 87% 87% 71% 
Caspian-EU - 26% 26% 55% 26% 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we present a stylized model of the European natural gas market with a focus on 
gas transmission. The model is intended to be used as market representation within a 
regulatory model approach which provides incentives for pipeline owners/operators to invest 
in new pipeline infrastructure. Consequently the model setting is simplified and only covers 
the main natural gas infrastructure in Europe.  
We simulate several scenarios to estimate the future development of the European natural gas 
market. Despite its simplified structure the obtained results highlight the existing bottlenecks 
in Europe, the importance of natural gas from the North Sea for the Central European region, 
the import dependency of Europe from Russian natural gas, and the price decreasing impact 
of LNG facilities. Further research will focus on the introduction of regulatory mechanism 
that encourages investment in cross-border long-distance natural gas transportation pipelines. 
In particular, the European grid will be considered to be operated by a European regulatory 
authority which then faces the difficulty to provide investment incentives in this capital-
intensive industry. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 4: 2005 reference case, average market prices and congestion 
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Figure 5: 2015 base case, average market prices and congestion 
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Figure 6: 2015 EU case, average market prices and congestion 
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Figure 7: 2015 Russian case, average market prices and congestion 
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Figure 8: 2015 LNG case, average market prices and congestion 
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